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Abstract 
Provider payment systems for mental health care that incentivise cost control and quality 
improvement have been a policy focus in a number of countries. In England, a new 
prospective provider payment system is being introduced to mental health that should 
encourage providers to control costs and improve outcomes. The aim of this research is to 
investigate the relationship between costs and outcomes to ascertain whether there is a trade-
off between controlling costs and improving outcomes. 
The main data source is the Mental Health Minimum Data Set (MHMDS) for the years 
2011/12 and 2012/13.  Costs are calculated using NHS Reference Cost data while outcomes 
are measured using the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS). We estimate a 
bivariate multi-level model with costs and outcomes simultaneously. We calculate the 
correlation and plot the pairwise relationship between residual costs and outcomes at the 
provider level. 
After controlling for a range of demographic, need, social and treatment variables, residual 
variation in costs and outcomes remains at the provider level. The correlation between 
residual costs and outcomes is negative, but very small suggesting that cost-containment 
efforts by providers should not undermine outcome-improving efforts under the new payment 
system. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Provider payment systems for mental health care that incentivise both cost control and quality 
improvement have been a policy focus in a number of countries. In the Netherlands, 
psychiatric care is included in the prospective activity-based payment system for inpatient 
and outpatient care [1]. Cost control is incentivised by nationally agreed unit prices and the 
system also incentivises quality improvements that reduce resource consumption [2]. In the 
US, psychiatric inpatient care provided under Medicare is reimbursed using a prospective per 
diem payment system that links payment to average cost in order to promote efficiency. The 
system employs variable per diem payments with higher payments at the beginning of the 
inpatient stay to reflect higher cost. The payment system is also designed to prevent adverse 
effects on quality of care by reimbursing readmissions within a short period of time at the per 
diem rate that was applied at the time of discharge [3].  
In England, mental health services have historically been funded through block contracts that 
do not necessarily incentivise providers to control cost [4] nor has payment been aligned to 
patient outcomes [5]. The prospective activity-based system used in the acute physical health 
care sector ± the National Tariff Payment System (NTPS) ± has recently been introduced to 
mental health.  A new classification system has been developed for mental health with a 
primary focus on patient need and severity, an important predictor of mental health resource 
use [6]. The currencies or units of activity for which payment will be made are 21 care 
clusters that are independent of care setting. Users of mental health care services are allocated 
to a care cluster by clinicians using the Mental Health Clustering Tool (MHCT). The MHCT 
incorporates items from the Health of the Nation Outcome Scales (HoNOS) [7] and the 
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Summary of Assessments of Risk and Need (SARN) [8]. HoNOS is comprised of 12 items, 
each scored from 0 (no problem) to 4 (severe problem) giving a total score ranging from 0 
(best) to 48 (worst). Ratings are made by an individual clinician (psychiatrist, nurse, 
psychologist, or social worker) or are based on a team rating. The rating is made on the basis 
of all information available to the clinician and is based on the most severe problem that 
arose during the two weeks leading up to the point of rating. 
After a patient is allocated to a care cluster, they should be reviewed on a regular basis to 
ensure that the care cluster continues to meet their needs. The time between care cluster 
assessments or cluster review periods (CRPs) forms the basis of contracts and prices agreed 
between providers and commissioners (responsible for the organisation and purchase of 
mental health care for their populations) [9, 10]. The aspiration is that each care cluster will 
have a fixed national price or tariff [10]. This will provide an incentive to control costs as 
providers with costs above (below) the tariff will incur financial losses (surpluses). Quality of 
care and patient outcomes will also be incentivised under the new payment system with the 
inclusion of quality and outcome measures in provider contracts and the intention to link 
these to prices [11]. While the care cluster currencies cover most services for working age 
adults and older people, some services such as children and adolescent, drug and alcohol, and 
specialist mental health services are not included and will be reimbursed under separate non-
cluster currencies [12].   
A small number of studies [13-16] have examined the relationship between costs and quality 
in mental health care with no clear consensus on whether a trade-off exists between the two. 
Previous studies investigating the relationship between costs and quality in both physical and 
mental health care have revealed that this is a challenging endeavour. Particular challenges 
relate to the availability of adequate measures of quality, small sample sizes and the 
endogenous relationship between costs and quality. Regarding the latter, a number of studies 
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[17-19] have used instrumental variables in order to consistently estimate the causal 
relationship. Nevertheless other studies [20, 21] have highlighted the inherent difficulty of 
addressing endogeneity including the limited availability of suitable instrumental variables. 
Given the challenge of finding suitable instrumental variables, we avoid the causal 
identification problem and motivated by the methodology used in studies that have assessed 
performance in physical health care [22, 23], we analyse costs and outcomes using two 
separate equations and allow for a correlation in responses.  As in previous studies [14, 21] 
we measure quality in terms of an outcome measure ± the Health of the Nation Outcome 
Scale (HoNOS).  Following earlier studies [18, 21-23] we use multi-level modelling which 
allows us to examine the correlation in residual responses at provider-level to provide insight 
into the relationship between costs and outcomes and whether a potential trade-off exists.  
The use of a large, nationally representative dataset with individual-level data moves us 
beyond prior studies in mental health care that were constrained by aggregate data [15, 16] or 
small patient sample sizes [13, 14]. 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between costs and outcomes for mental 
health providers in England to ascertain if incentives provided by the NTPS to control costs 
can be achieved without negatively affecting patient outcomes. We do not attempt to estimate 
the causal relationship between costs and outcomes; rather we estimate a multi-level bivariate 
model with costs and outcomes as responses. We calculate the correlation between the 
residual variation in costs and outcomes for providers, before and after controlling for a range 
of risk-adjustment covariates encompassing socio-demographic, need and treatment 
variables. Our method also allows us to group providers according to their performance on 
residual costs and outcomes. 
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We contribute to existing evidence in several ways.  This paper is the first to use a multi-level 
bivariate model to examine mental health cost and outcome responses simultaneously and 
calculate the correlation in residual variation between two responses.  We isolate the residual 
variation in costs and outcomes attributable to mental health providers in order to assess 
provider performance. Moreover, while previous studies in mental health have used data with 
limited geographical or provider samples, we use a nationally-representative dataset that 
contains data for all specialist mental health providers in England.  This means that we can 
examine costs and quality for both admitted and non-admitted care and are not constrained to 
just one care setting as in previous studies. Finally, our findings provide a better 
understanding of the incentives introduced by the new payment system and whether a trade-
off between cost containment and outcome improving efforts exists.  
 
2. METHODS 
The CRP forms the unit of observation in this analysis. As a patient can have more than one 
CRP we utilise a multi-level model to reflect CRPs nested within patients who are in turn 
nested within providers.   
We estimate the following bivariate model with two response variables for CRP i in patient j 
in provider k: cost y1ijk and outcome y2ijk: 
൝ݕ ? ൌ ߙ ? ൅ ߚ ?ܺ  ? ൅ ݑ ? ൅ ݒ ? ൅ ߝ ?ݕ ? ൌ ߙ ? ൅ ߚ ?ܺ  ? ൅ ݑ ? ൅ ݒ ? ൅ ߝ ?                  (1) 
    ቆ ௨భೖ௨మೖ ቇ׽N (0, ȍu ) : ቆߪଶ௨ ?  ߪ௨ ?௨ ? ߪଶ௨ ? ቇ                                    (2) 
X1ijk and X2ijk represent vectors of risk-adjustment covariates for the cost and outcome 
equations respectively.  The provider-level residual variance for costs and outcomes is 
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represented by the random effects u1k and u2k respectively.  The patient-level residual 
variances for each response are denoted by v1jk and v2jkZKLOHİ1ijk DQGİ2ijk signify the error 
terms at the CRP level for each response.  The provider-level residuals, u1k and u2k are both 
assumed to foOORZDELYDULDWHQRUPDOGLVWULEXWLRQZLWK]HURPHDQDQGFRYDULDQFHPDWUL[ȍu.  
Our interest lies in the correlation between the residual variation in y1ijk and y2ijk at the 
provider level which can be calculated as r(x,y) = 
ఙೠ ?ೠ ?ටఙమೠ ? ఙమೠ ?  . We calculate this correlation for 
responses with and without risk-adjustment to gain an insight into the extent to which our 
risk-adjustment variables account for correlation between outcomes. 
Our cost response variable y1ijk is modelled using a log-linear model and our outcome 
response variable y2ijk using a linear model.  The multilevel estimates are statistically efficient 
even if some observations have missing data for either response under the assumption that 
data is missing at random [24].   
 
The coefficients for the cost response can be interpreted in terms of a percentage change in 
the geometric mean of cost.  For covariates measured as dummy variables, this is the 
percentage change in the geometric mean resulting from a change in the variable from zero to 
one which can be calculateGDV H[Sȕ± 1)*100.  For continuous variables, the coefficient 
can be interpreted as the change in the geometric mean in cost resulting from a one unit 
change in this variable. The coefficients for the outcome response can be interpreted in terms 
of marginal effects; the change in this variable arising from a change in a binary independent 
variable from zero to one, and a one-unit change in continuous variables. 
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The model is estimated using restrictive iterative generalised least squares (RIGLS) which is 
equivalent to restricted maximum likelihood [25] in MLwiN [24] using the runmlwin 
command [26] in Stata 13.0 [27]. 
 
We performed a sensitivity analysis by excluding a provider that is an outlier on the outcome 
response.  
3. DATA 
3.1. Reference Cost data 
Reference Cost data is submitted by publicly owned providers to the Department of Health 
and reflects the costs of providing mental health services. Reference Cost data for mental 
health care is reported as per diem costs per care cluster for admitted and non-admitted care 
separately for each provider. The Reference Cost data was cleaned by omitting data for 
outliers defined as greater than 4 times the cost reported in the previous (for 2012/13 data) or 
following year (for 2011/12 data) (n=102,121). This resulted in dropping one provider with 
consistently high costs for all clusters across both years giving a sample size of 55 providers.  
To construct our cost response variable, we measured all activity during a CRP that 
corresponded to mental health services reimbursed under the care clusters. For each 
observation (CRP), we calculated the total number of days or length of stay in admitted and 
non-admitted care. These length of stay variables were then multiplied by the per diem unit 
costs for admitted and non-admitted care for the particular care cluster and provider in order 
to construct a variable reflecting the total cost associated with a CRP.  It is important to 
highlight that the use of cost data reported at a provider level, albeit disaggregated by cluster 
and admitted and non-admitted care will conceal the true variation in cost that would be 
evident in data reported at the patient level. We used the 2011/12 Reference Cost data for 
activity between 1 April 2011 and 31 March 2012 and the 2012/13 Reference Cost data for 
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activity between 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2013.  For activity between 1 April 2011 and 31 
March 2013 we calculated a weighted average cost that reflects the number of days during a 
CRP in each year.   
3.2. Mental Health Minimum Data Set (MHMDS) 
The MHMDS is a patient-level data set with national coverage for England. It is mandatory 
for providers of specialist, including elderly, mental health services funded by the NHS to 
submit MHMDS data on a quarterly and annual basis.  The MHMDS contains data on all the 
care and treatment received by a service user irrespective of setting. We use Version 4.0 of 
the MHMDS, which covers 2011/12 and 2012/13 and includes information pertaining to the 
NTPS for mental health. As patients are not potentially identifiable from the data, and are not 
directly involved in the research, ethical approval was not required. The MHMDS data was 
cleaned to remove observations that: are duplicates; have age coded as less than 18 years or 
greater than 110 years, and are treated by private providers. We also dropped observations 
with inpatient days in the 99th percentile for clusters 1 (Common mental health problems, 
low severity) and 2 (Common mental health problems) (n=833). Admission thresholds have 
increased [28-30] to the extent that patients are being admitted under the Mental Health Act 
(MHA) in order to access inpatient treatment [31]. Therefore, we would not expect patients in 
clusters 1 and 2 to receive long periods of inpatient treatment due to demand pressures on 
inpatient beds. 
 
HoNOS is routinely collected as part of the MHMDS, both as part of the MHCT and as an 
outcome measure. We use the total HoNOS score recorded as part of the MHCT at the end of 
a CRP (follow-up HoNOS) as our outcome response. Risk-adjustment covariates can vary for 
each response. The total HoNOS score recorded at the start (baseline) of a CRP is included as 
a risk-adjustment variable for the outcome response only as previous studies [32-35] show 
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that baseline outcome is a consistent predictor of follow-up outcome. Risk-adjustment 
covariates for both responses cover demographic, treatment, need and social variables. 
Demographic variables include age, gender (with female as the reference category), ethnicity 
(White (reference category), Black, Asian and Other) and married/civil partner (with 
unmarried/no civil partner as the reference category).  Age is grouped into five categories 
reflecting quintiles of the distribution in order to capture any non-linearities in the 
relationship with cost and outcomes with age 18-34 years the reference category. Variables 
reflecting if a patient has care co-ordinated under the Care Programme Approach (CPA) (a 
method of assessing, planning and reviewing the needs of a person with severe mental 
illness) or has been admitted to hospital under the Mental Health Act (MHA) provides 
information on severity and treatment. Missing values of CPA and MHA were coded as zero 
under the assumption that it is unlikely these observations were subject to the MHA or under 
CPA, given the high levels of scrutiny of these activities.  We include dummy variables for 
the 21 care clusters to investigate the extent to which these explain variations in costs and 
outcomes.  We use the cluster with the lowest cost (cluster 1 - common mental health 
problems, low severity) as the reference category. The MHMDS also contains data for a 
small area level geographic marker, the Lower Layer Super Output Area (LSOA) of the 
individual. LSOAs are a geographic hierarchy with a minimum population of 1000 and a 
mean of 1500 [36]. We matched LSOA codes in the MHMDS to data on the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) Income Domain [37]. The IMD Income Domain measures the 
proportions of the population experiencing income deprivation in an area [37]. A higher score 
for the Income Domain indicates a greater proportion of the population in the area in which 
the patient lives experiences income deprivation. A dummy variable is included as a covariate 
for both responses in order to capture the year (2011/12 and 2012/13) in which the cluster 
commenced with 2011/12 as the reference category.   
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4. RESULTS 
4.1. Response variables 
Figure 1 shows our cost response variable and figure 2 our outcome response variable 
measured at the CRP level.   
Insert Figure 1 around here 
Insert Figure 2 around here 
The graphs show that both variables are approximately normally distributed although the 
outcome response variable is slightly right skewed reflecting a smaller number of 
observations with high follow-up HoNOS scores (and more severe mental health problems). 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Our estimation sample is 697,022 observations treated by 55 providers of which 269,525 
observations have both cost and outcome responses, 419,879 observations have the cost 
response only, and 7,618 have the outcome response only.  
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for our estimation sample with reference categories 
in brackets.   
Insert Table 1 around here 
4.3. Estimation results 
Table 2 displays the estimation results.  All variables are statistically significant with the 
exception of Other ethnicity and cluster 11 (ongoing recurrent psychosis, low symptoms) for 
the total follow-up HoNOS dependent variable. 
Insert Table 2 around here 
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For the log of total cost response variable, many of the cluster variables are associated with 
the largest effects. For example, cluster 14 (psychotic crisis) is associated with a 647% and 
cluster 17 (psychosis and affective disorder difficult to engage) a 555% increase in cost 
compared to cluster 1 (common mental health problems, low severity). Other clusters 
associated with psychosis (clusters 10, 13 and 15) are also associated with considerable 
increases of over 400% compared to cluster 1. CRPs that have an admission under the MHA 
variable are associated with a 98% increase in cost. In terms of demographic variables, Black 
ethnicity is associated with an increase of 9% in costs compared to White ethnicity while age 
of 63-79 years is associated with an increase in costs of 34% compared to age 18-34 years. 
CRPs that started in 2012/13 are associated with a 39% reduction in costs compared to CRPs 
that started in 2011/12.  Unit costs for non-admitted care reported by providers fell from 
2011/12 to 2012/13 and we believe this is driving the negative association between Total 
Cost and CRPs that started in 2012/13. 
For the follow-up HoNOS response variable, a positive coefficient signifies a worse outcome. 
Covariates associated with an improved outcome include being married or having a civil 
partner, Asian and Black ethnicities compared to White ethnicity, and older age.  
Marriage/civil partnership and age 80 years or over are associated with a reduced HoNOS 
score of around 0.4 points while Black ethnicity is associated with a reduction of 0.3 points. 
The MHA and CPA variables are associated with an increase in the follow-up HoNOS score 
of 0.4-0.5 points.  Similar to the cost response, the clusters with higher severity are associated 
with greater magnitudes of effects. Compared to cluster 1 (common mental health problems, 
low severity) cluster 15 (severe psychotic depression) and cluster 16 (dual diagnosis, 
substance abuse and mental illness) are associated with an increase of 3.6 points and 3.9 
points respectively. Clusters for cognitive impairment or dementia are associated with an 
increase of 4.4 points (cluster 20 ± cognitive impairment or dementia, high need) and 5.5 
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points (cluster 21 ± cognitive impairment or dementia, high physical need) compared to 
cluster 1.  A CRP that started in 2012/13 is associated with an increased HoNOS score of 
around 0.2 points. 
4.4. Residual variation in provider costs and outcomes 
The correlation between residual costs and outcomes at the provider level was calculated as -
0.004 for unadjusted outcomes and -0.02 for risk-adjusted outcomes suggesting little 
evidence of a meaningful relationship between the two variables. 
Figure 3 shows the pairwise plot in risk-adjusted residual costs and outcomes for the 
providers in our analysis.   
Insert Figure 3 around here 
The providers fit quite evenly into four groups; those associated with 1) higher costs and 
lower follow-up HoNOS scores (better outcome) in the top left quadrant, 2) higher costs and 
higher follow-up HoNOS scores (worse outcome) in the top right quadrant, 3) lower costs 
and higher follow-up HoNOS scores (worse outcome) in the bottom right quadrant, and 4) 
lower costs and lower follow-up HoNOS scores (better outcome) in the bottom left quadrant.                                            
There is an outlier provider with a residual follow-up HoNOS score of just over 4 points 
above the average and slightly above-average residual costs.  Compared to the average, this 
outlier provider has higher than average baseline and follow-up HoNOS scores, and higher 
than average proportions of observations of White ethnicity; in the older age groups (63-79 
years and 80 years and over); under CPA; in cognitive impairment or dementia clusters 
(clusters 18 and 19); and with lower income deprivation. 
The estimates of risk-adjusted residual costs and outcomes at the provider level are 
normalised to have a mean of zero. The follow-up HoNOS response variable is measured on 
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a continuous scale from 0 (best) to 48 (worst) meaning that a positive score for the residual 
total follow-up HoNOS score signifies a worse outcome. The best performer in relation to 
outcomes is associated with a risk-adjusted residual follow-up HoNOS score of 1.36 less than 
the average performer while the worst performer is associated with a risk-adjusted residual 
follow-up HoNOS score of 4.23 greater than the average performer. The estimates of residual 
Total Cost can be interpreted as percentage increases or decreases in the geometric mean of 
Total Cost compared to the average as calculated as (exp (EB estimate) ± 1)*100. The best 
performing provider in relation to risk-adjusted residual Total Cost is associated with a Total 
Cost that is 71% lower than the average performing provider while the worst performing 
provider in relation to risk-adjusted residual Total Cost is associated with a Total Cost that is 
194% higher than the average performing provider. 
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
The exclusion of the provider with the above-average risk-adjusted residual follow-up 
HoNOS score of 4.23 decreased the estimation sample to 681,305 observations.  The 
estimation results were robust to this change.  The correlation between risk-adjusted residual 
costs and outcomes at the provider level became -0.09. Figure 4 displays the pairwise plot in 
residual costs and outcomes for the 54 providers in the sensitivity analysis. The risk-adjusted 
residual follow-up HoNOS score reduced to 1.39 for the worst performing provider on 
follow-up HoNOS scores compared to the average performing provider for this response. 
There was also a small reduction regarding risk-adjusted residual Total Cost with the worst 
performing provider associated with a Total Cost that is 191% higher than the average 
performing provider. 
Insert Figure 4 around here 
5. DISCUSSION 
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The reimbursement of mental health care providers in England is undergoing a considerable 
reform with the introduction of a prospective, activity-based payment system. From April 
2017, all mental health providers and commissioners are required to link payment to locally 
agreed quality and outcome measures [11] and some local health economies have already 
developed outcome measures and indicators for payment purposes [38]. The new system will 
offer incentives for providers to deliver care more efficiently while better meeting patient 
needs and improving outcomes. This research has explored the relationship between mental 
health costs and outcomes in order to examine the scope for providers to respond to the 
incentives introduced by the new payment system and makes an important contribution to the 
limited literature for mental health care. 
Prior to risk-adjustment, we find evidence of a very small negative correlation between costs 
and outcomes at the provider-level. After controlling for a range of demographic, need, social 
and treatment factors, we find that residual variation remains in both costs and outcomes at 
the provider level. However, the correlation between residual costs and outcomes at the 
provider level is miniscule, which suggests that a trade-off between cost containment and 
outcome improving efforts on the part of providers is not a major concern in our data. 
Plotting the provider-level residual costs and outcome response variables reveals that 
providers broadly fall into four groups with an outlier provider. Providers with higher than 
average residual costs and higher than average residual follow-up HoNOS scores (worse 
outcome) may signify poor performance but may also indicate that certain providers are 
treating a case-mix that our model has not fully accounted for. While patient case mix is 
controlled for to a certain extent by the care clusters, the clustering method does not explicitly 
take diagnosis into account and it is likely that the clusters are very variable in terms of 
diagnosis and case mix [4, 39]. It may also be the case that some patients have treatment-
resistant variants of mental illness which implies that they will be consuming large amounts 
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of care and resources with little discernible changes in outcome scores [40]. If certain 
providers have a higher case-load of such patients this could well explain their unexplained 
higher costs and worse outcomes. If the higher costs are legitimate then these providers may 
warrant additional payments as defined by any outlier policy attached to the payment system. 
A number of providers are associated with lower residual follow-up HoNOS scores (better 
outcome) but also with higher residual costs. These providers in particular may face a 
potential trade-off between costs and outcomes and efforts to reduce costs under a national 
tariff may compromise outcomes if providers are induced to undertake undesirable 
behaviours such as skimping on patient care. A number of providers have lower than average 
residual costs and lower than average residual follow-up HoNOS scores (better outcome).  
These providers are likely to benefit financially from the new payment system if a national 
tariff is introduced and patient outcomes are linked to provider payment.  Providers with 
lower than average residual costs and higher than average residual follow-up HoNOS scores 
(worse outcome) may have scope to make financial profits under a national tariff but these 
may be offset if payment is linked to outcomes. If providers are achieving lower costs at the 
expense of patient outcomes then they would warrant particular scrutiny by commissioners 
under quality and outcomes standards established in the contracting process. 
It is important to highlight a number of limitations regarding the data we use. Concerns have 
been raised regarding the quality of mental health Reference Cost data in particular in relation 
to variations in unit costs within clusters and between providers as well as issues around 
missing data [41]. A further limitation of the cost data used is that it is essentially provider-
level cost data that underpins our dependent cost variable. While variation in the dependent 
cost variable will arise for patients in different clusters with different care patterns, a greater 
level of variation would be observed if we had access to data on the actual costs incurred by 
individual patients, rather than the provider average. While the MHMDS contains variables 
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on primary and secondary diagnoses, poor coding of this data inhibited inclusion of diagnosis 
in our set of risk-adjustment variables. A further data limitation is the missing data for 
follow-up HoNOS scores. We assume that this data is missing at random but this assumption 
would not hold if, for example, patients with more severe mental health problems are more 
likely to drop out of care and not have a follow-up HoNOS score recorded. Due to the poor 
coding of diagnosis data we are unable to investigate this hypothesis. Despite these data 
limitations, this research provides a valuable insight into the relationship between mental 
health costs and outcomes that is pertinent in the context of prospective activity-based 
payment. Our data show no evidence of a strong relationship between costs and outcomes. 
This provides some reassurance that outcome improvements can be obtained without 
spending a lot more, or, conversely, that some savings are possible. The research will be 
useful to commissioners of mental health services by providing an indication of how 
providers perform on disparate objectives. This work also benefits policymakers in planning 
future refinements to the payment system.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total cost 689404 3448.076 9783.937 
log of total cost 689404 6.919 1.615 
Total HoNOS follow-up score  277143 11 6 
Total HoNOS baseline score 277143 11 6 
Married/civil partner [Unmarried/ 
no civil partner] 697022 0.331 0.470 
[White ethnicity]  697022 0.877 0.329 
Asian ethnicity 697022 0.046 0.208 
Black ethnicity 697022 0.047 0.211 
Other ethnicity 697022 0.031 0.173 
[Age category 1 (18-34)]  697022 0.204 0.403 
Age category 2 (35-46) 697022 0.191 0.393 
Age category 3 (47-62) 697022 0.207 0.405 
Age category 4 (63-79) 697022 0.204 0.403 
Age category 5 (80+) 697022 0.194 0.395 
Gender [Female] 697022 0.436 0.496 
Admitted under the MHA 697022 0.088 0.283 
Under CPA 697022 0.413 0.492 
Cluster 0: Variance 697022 0.011 0.103 
[Cluster 1: Common mental health 
problems, low severity] 697022 0.039 0.195 
Cluster 2: Common mental health 
problems 697022 0.050 0.219 
Cluster 3: Nonpsychotic, 697022 0.116 0.321 
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moderate severity 
Cluster 4: Non-psychotic, severe 697022 0.088 0.283 
Cluster 5: Non-psychotic, very 
severe 697022 0.032 0.175 
Cluster 6: Non-psychotic disorders 
of overvalued ideas 697022 0.017 0.128 
Cluster 7: Enduring non-psychotic 
disorders 697022 0.039 0.193 
Cluster 8: Non-psychotic chaotic 
and challenging disorders 697022 0.036 0.186 
Cluster 10: First episode in 
psychosis 697022 0.027 0.163 
Cluster 11: Ongoing recurrent 
psychosis, low symptoms 697022 0.090 0.286 
Cluster 12: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high disability 697022 0.064 0.246 
Cluster 13: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high symptom/disability 697022 0.046 0.209 
Cluster 14: Psychotic crisis 697022 0.029 0.167 
Cluster 15: Severe psychotic 
depression 697022 0.010 0.102 
Cluster 16: Dual diagnosis, 
substance abuse and mental 
illness 697022 0.016 0.127 
Cluster 17: Psychosis and 
affective disorder difficult to 
engage 697022 0.022 0.148 
Cluster 18: Cognitive impairment, 
low need 697022 0.098 0.297 
Cluster 19: Cognitive impairment 
or dementia, moderate need 697022 0.107 0.310 
Cluster 20: Cognitive impairment 
or dementia, high need 697022 0.043 0.204 
Cluster 21: Cognitive impairment 
or dementia, high physical need 697022 0.019 0.135 
Income Deprivation 697022 17.988 11.785 
CRP started in 2012/13 [CRP 
started in 2011/12] 697022 0.423 0.494 
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Table 2. Estimation Results 
 
 Observations per group 
 
 Number of 
observations Minimum Average Maximum 
Level 3: Provider 55 33 12673 54090 
Level 2: Person 414092 1 1.7 43 
Level 1: CRP 697022       
Log likelihood -2065741    
  
Log of total cost Total follow-up HoNOS  
  
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Total HoNOS baseline score 
  
0.388 0.002*** 
Married/civil partner 0.009 0.004* -0.378 0.025*** 
Asian ethnicity 0.026 0.009** -0.121 0.057* 
Black ethnicity 0.083 0.010*** -0.302 0.063*** 
Other ethnicity 0.031 0.011** -0.050 0.070 
Age category 2 (35-46) 0.086 0.006*** 0.191 0.037*** 
Age category 3 (47-62) 0.147 0.006*** 0.169 0.036*** 
Age category 4 (63-79) 0.295 0.007*** -0.338 0.041*** 
Age category 5 (80+) 0.181 0.008*** -0.401 0.048*** 
Gender 0.011 0.004** 0.236 0.023*** 
Admitted under the MHA 0.681 0.008*** 0.484 0.042*** 
Under CPA 0.231 0.005*** 0.407 0.026*** 
Cluster 0: Variance 0.286 0.019*** 1.094 0.128*** 
Cluster 2: Common mental health 
problems 0.378 0.012*** 0.539 0.084*** 
Cluster 3: Nonpsychotic, moderate 
severity 0.686 0.010*** 1.262 0.075*** 
Cluster 4: Non-psychotic, severe 1.019 0.011*** 2.232 0.076*** 
Cluster 5: Non-psychotic, very severe 1.323 0.013*** 3.129 0.087*** 
Cluster 6: Non-psychotic disorders of 1.284 0.016*** 3.003 0.102*** 
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overvalued ideas 
Cluster 7: Enduring non-psychotic 
disorders 1.280 0.013*** 2.995 0.085*** 
Cluster 8: Non-psychotic chaotic and 
challenging disorders 1.347 0.013*** 3.390 0.087*** 
Cluster 10: First episode in psychosis 1.684 0.014*** 1.550 0.092*** 
Cluster 11: Ongoing recurrent 
psychosis, low symptoms 1.035 0.011*** 0.125 0.076 
Cluster 12: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high disability 1.468 0.012*** 1.833 0.078*** 
Cluster 13: Ongoing or recurrent 
psychosis, high symptom/disability 1.720 0.013*** 3.020 0.083*** 
Cluster 14: Psychotic crisis 2.011 0.014*** 3.412 0.089*** 
Cluster 15: Severe psychotic 
depression 1.626 0.020*** 3.562 0.118*** 
Cluster 16: Dual diagnosis, substance 
abuse and mental illness 1.528 0.017*** 3.871 0.103*** 
Cluster 17: Psychosis and affective 
disorder difficult to engage 1.880 0.015*** 3.373 0.095*** 
Cluster 18: Cognitive impairment, low 
need 0.186 0.011*** 0.385 0.079*** 
Cluster 19: Cognitive impairment or 
dementia, moderate need 0.550 0.011*** 2.310 0.079*** 
Cluster 20: Cognitive impairment or 
dementia, high need 0.808 0.013*** 4.354 0.089*** 
Cluster 21: Cognitive impairment or 
dementia, high physical need 0.681 0.016*** 5.462 0.113*** 
Income Deprivation 0.000 0.000* 0.014 0.001*** 
CRP started in 2012/13 -0.494 0.004*** 0.195 0.020*** 
Constant 5.934 0.057*** 4.648 0.148*** 
Random Effects Parameters Estimate Standard Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Level 3: Provider 
    
Variance: Log of total cost 0.170 0.033 0.106 0.234 
Variance: Follow-up total HoNOS 0.748 0.052 -0.109 0.095 
Covariance: Log of total cost, Follow-up 
total HoNOS -0.007 0.159 0.436 1.060 
Level 2: Person 
    
Variance: Log of total cost 0.291 0.004 0.284 0.298 
Variance: Follow-up total HoNOS 5.407 0.013 0.038 0.089 
Covariance: Log of total cost, Follow-up 
total HoNOS 0.063 0.073 5.263 5.551 
Level 1: CRP 
    
Variance: Log of total cost 1.768 0.004 1.760 1.776 
Variance: Follow-up total HoNOS 21.000 0.015 -0.078 -0.017 
Covariance: Log of total cost, Follow-up 
total HoNOS 0.047 0.078 20.848 21.153 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
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Figure 1. Log of Total Cost 
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Figure 2. Total follow-up HoNOS score 
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Figure 3. Pairwise plot of residual costs and outcomes for providers 
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Figure 4. Pairwise plot of residual costs and outcomes for providers for sensitivity 
analysis 
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